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Drawing on survey data, this paper identifies the determinants of variations in farm gate 
milk prices for three CIS countries (Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine). We apply a multi-
level modeling approach, specifically a bootstrapped mixed-effects linear regression model. 
The analysis suggests three main strategies to improve the price received by farmers for 
their output: consolidation, competition for output and stable supply chain relationships. In 
Armenia and Ukraine selling through a marketing cooperative has a significant, positive, 
albeit modest, effect on farm gate milk prices. In all three countries studied, the size of 
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Farmers’ welfare will depend mostly on the price received for their output in environments of 
minimal agricultural policy support, the absence of social safety nets, and a weak non-farm rural 
economy  which  limits  agricultural  diversification.  These  features  characterize  much  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)
1,  where  rural  poverty  is  widespread.  The  price 
received by farmers for their output is thus of considerable concern. Yet evidence to date for the 
CIS indicates that since the break-up of the USSR farm gate prices have often been significantly 
below  international  prices  (Striewe,  1999;  von  Cramon-Taubadel,  Zorya  and  Striewe,  2001; 
World  Bank,  2005;  von  Cramon-Taubadel  et  al.  2007;  Liefert  and  Liefert,  2007)  and  vary 
considerably  between  producers  (Keyser,  2004).  The  latter  has  been  attributed  to  uneven 
competition (Kazmer and Konrad, 2004) caused by weak physical and commercial infrastructure. 
Poor physical and commercial / institutional infrastructure raise transport and transaction costs 
(Striewe,  1999;  Gow  and  Swinnen,  2001)  and  increase  the  likelihood  of  incomplete  price 
information  (Swinnen,  2005;  Liefert  and  Liefert,  2007).  Where  physical  and  commercial 
infrastructure is weak, farmers are less likely to be aware of the prices received by others, and 
processors  /  other  purchasers  may  act  as  local  monoponsies  (Cochrane,  2007).  Erratic  /  rent 
seeking  government  intervention  may  reinforce  these  problems  (von  Cramon-Taubadel  et  al. 
2007).  While  case  studies  (Striewe,  1999;  Cocks,  Gow  and  Westgren,  2005;  Gorton, 
Dumitrashko,  and  White,  2006)  and  aggregate  market  analysis  (von  Cramon-Taubadel  et  al. 
2007; Liefert and Liefert, 2007) identify these difficulties in the CIS, there is an absence of cross-
sectional data analysis on the prices received by farmers in CIS markets.  
 
This paper analyses data for three CIS countries (Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine), seeking to 
identify the determinants of variations in farm gate milk prices. Several studies document severe 
problems affecting milk marketing in the CIS (Cocks, Gow and Westgren, 2005; Engels and 
Sardaryan,  2006;  Gorton,  Dumitrashko,  and  White,  2006).  Some  of  the  problems  faced  are 
                                                 
1  The  CIS  comprises  countries  that  were  formerly  Soviet  Republics,  excluding  Estonia,  Georgia,  Latvia  and 
Lithuania. Ukraine is regarded as only a de facto CIS state, as despite being one of the founding states it did not 
ratify the CIS charter.   4 
common  to  other  branches  of  agriculture  –  a  fragmented  and  typically  poorly  capitalized 
production base, weak rural infrastructure and high levels of opportunistic behavior. However the 
perishable  nature  of  milk  coupled  with  its  production  pattern  (milking  twice  a  day)  and  the 
counter cyclical nature of supply and demand between summer and winter aggravate marketing 
difficulties (Engels and Sardayan, 2006). In the immediate post-Soviet period many dairy supply 
chains collapsed and rebuilding the sector has proved more difficult than some initially envisaged 
(Cochrane, 2007). Low farm gate prices, substantially below international / border prices, limit 
the viability of private investment and encourage a deeper consideration of price determination.  
In doing so the paper contributes to a wider literature on price heterogeneity in developing and 
transitional economies. We specifically investigate whether marketing cooperatives raise farm 
gate prices for their members. The latter is of substantial policy interest given a desire to assist 
small-scale farmers to improve value added (Reardon et al. 2009) and the dependence of rural 
areas in the CIS on agriculture (World Bank, 2005).  
 
A wide array of farms, ranging from rural households with 1 or 2 cows up to large corporate 
enterprises with herds of 10,000 milking cows, characterizes the CIS dairy sector. Small-scale 
dairy farming is prevalent in much of the rural CIS. For example, Dumitrashko (2003) estimated 
that more than 40 per cent of rural Moldovan households kept at least one cow and the majority 
of one cow units sold at least some of their output. However, less than 6 per cent of households 
possessed  three  or  more  cows.  Such  small-scale  production  is  often  discounted,  but  in  an 
environment of low incomes and weak social safety nets, it may have a significant effect on rural 
welfare.
2  To  illustrate,  Keyser  (2004)  calculated  that  a  two  cow  herd  in  2003,  produced  an 
average profit of €90 per annum in Moldova. While this may appear modest, compared against an 
average monthly salary in agriculture and pension of €32 and €15 respectively for the same year 
(Biroul Naţional de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, 2007) it is apparent that dairy farming can 
represent an important source of rural income. In this context, fairly small changes in agricultural 
output prices, even for those marketing small quantities, may impact significantly on welfare. 
Hence the factors that determine price heterogeneity are worthy of study. 
 
                                                 
2 No government in any the countries studied, during the period of data analysis (2005-6), imposed a minimum or set 
price for milk.  
   5 
The paper consists of six sections. The next section reviews the literature on price heterogeneity. 
This is followed by a presentation of the econometric analysis and dataset. Results relate to the 
determinants of the marketing channel utilized and the price received by farmers for their milk. 
Drawing on the analysis, the conclusion details three strategies for improving the prices received 






1.  Price Heterogeneity 
 
In keeping with Varian’s (2000, p.187) oft quoted remark that the law of one price is ‘no law at 
all’,  several  empirical  studies  uncover  significant  price  dispersion  even  after  controlling  for 
product heterogeneity (Lewis, 2008; Sorensen, 2000). In other words, firms in the same market 
sell ‘identical goods for different prices (at the same time)’ (Lewis, 2008, p.654). To explain 
price dispersion, economists tend to assume that some form of heterogeneity holds (Besancenot 
and  Vranceanu,  2004).  These  assumptions  can  be  grouped  into  three  categories,  relating  to 




Search  models  posit  that  price  dispersion  can  arise  as  a  stable  equilibrium  outcome  where 
consumers possess imperfect information and the search costs of price shopping are positive. 
Consumers vary in terms of the information they possess and search costs. A firm may be able to 
charge a higher price for the same good as a competitor, if there is some probability that a 
randomly arriving consumer is unaware of the competitor’s lower price and chooses to purchase 
rather than incur the cost of seeking additional price quotations (Sorensen, 2000). Similarly a 
producer may sell at a lower price if s/he is unaware of other actors willing to pay more. A mass 
of small-scale, often isolated, producers characterize most markets in developing and transitional 
economies, particularly in rural areas (IFAD, 2001). As small-scale rural market systems lack 
publically announced prices or detailed market information systems, imperfect information on 
prices is likely to be severe (Brooks, 2010).   6 
 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs refer to the ‘pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs associated with arranging and 
carrying out an exchange of goods or services’ (Holloway et al. 2000, p. 281). The main forms 
are search, bargaining, monitoring, enforcement, maladaptation and transport costs (Williamson, 
1985). The poor state of rural infrastructure in the CIS raises transaction costs considerably, 
particularly for a perishable product such as milk. This problem is compounded by the sparsely 
populated, remote nature and low local purchasing power, of most rural areas in the region. 
Unofficial fees and shipping hazards (damaged or stolen goods during transit) are also relatively 
high in the CIS (Porto, 2005). Goetz (1992) demonstrates that transaction costs lower the prices 
received by farmers as sellers of agricultural output and raise their input prices. In general for a 
buyer the transaction costs of sourcing a given quality of raw materials from a small number of 
larger suppliers will be less than procuring from a mass of small-scale producers. Transaction 
costs therefore tend to favor larger farms (Swinnen, 2005) and a buyer may pass on some of the 
saved costs to larger producers, in the form of a higher relative price, in an attempt to secure their 
output, particularly in a market characterized by growing demand.  
 
Transaction costs may be reduced by cutting the number of exchange relationships through the 
creation of cooperative / intermediary institutions (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). For example a milk 
marketing cooperative may provide a bulking and bargaining service so that a processor need not 
deal directly with small farms (Holloway et al. 2000). A marketing cooperative / intermediary 
may  also  improve  the  flow  of  information  to  farmers,  so  that  production  better  meets  the 
requirements of a market, and increase the bargaining power of members. This bargaining power 
may lead to members receiving higher prices relative to non-members (Morgan, 2008). Staatz 
(1987) argues that establishing such countervailing power is critical as individually farmers are 
weak compared to concentrated input and processing industries. A marketing cooperative may 
also decrease the likelihood of opportunism by buyers, as losing the supply of a collective of 
farmers  would  be  more  damaging  than  terminating  a  relationship  with  a  single,  small-scale 
producer.  Reducing  opportunism  may  encourage  investment  and  hence  increase  productivity 
(Gow,  Streeter,  and  Swinnen,  2000).  However  while  the  theoretical  arguments  in  favor  of 
marketing cooperatives are well known, in practice their performance in developing countries has   7 
been  patchy  (Glover,  1987).  In  Eastern  Europe,  farmers  have  been  reluctant  to  join  such 
arrangements, a tendency often linked to a legacy of distrust of collective arrangements stemming 
from experiences under communist regimes (Gardner and Lerman, 2006). 
 
An important characteristic of CIS markets, particularly in the early years of transition, was a 
high  level  of  opportunistic  behavior  on  the  part  of  buyers,  sellers  and  regulatory  agencies 
(Safavian, Graham, and Gonzalez-Vega, 2001). Weak and ineffective systems of legal redress 
compounded  this  problem  so  that  firms  turned  to  internal  or  purely  private  enforcement 
mechanisms based on constructed mutual dependence or trust (Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman, 
2000). This included attempts to establish self-enforcing contracts (Gow, Streeter, and Swinnen, 
2000) and rewarding loyal buyers / suppliers. As Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (2000, p.649) 
remark  ‘in  the  chaotic  world  of  the  transition,  strategies  that  use  trust  -  both  personal  and 
calculative  -  emerge  as  critical’.  Interviews  with  food  processors  revealed  that  while  larger 
suppliers are preferred in general, trust, stable relationships and willingness to learn were as, if 
not more, important (Gorton and White, 2007). 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Spatially uneven competition 
Models of monopolistic competition suggest that increased competition is associated with lower 
average output prices and a lower level of price dispersion (Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck, 2004). 
In supply chains, greater competition should lead to more equal rent sharing, evidenced by higher 
producer prices and more services for farmers (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). There is empirical 
evidence  to  support  these  notions.  Data  for  retail  gasoline  markets  consistently  indicate  that 
average prices and price dispersion are negatively related to the number of stations within a 
particular geographic market area (Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck, 2004; Eckert and West, 2006). 
Evidence for the Bulgarian (Noev, Dries, and Swinnen, 2009) and Polish (Dries and Swinnen, 
2004) dairy sector reveals that competition encourages processors to match or offer enhanced 
supplier assistance programs in order to protect their supply base. Case study evidence suggests 
that  farmers  are  worst  placed  when  faced  with  a  privately  owned  or  government  controlled 
monopsony  (Gorton  and  White,  2007;  Sadler,  2006).  Wegren  (1996)  argues  that  local 
monopsonies  are  common  in  the  CIS  as  Soviet  planners  built  food  processing  plants  (mills, 
dairies etc.) on a one for each oblast (region) basis, with no direct competition between them for   8 
raw materials. During the early years of transition these local monopsonies often remained in 
place because of transport and logistical difficulties and the political connections of established 
firms, which ‘insulated lone buyers within each region from competition with buyers outside the 
region’ (Kazmer and Konrad, 2004, p.54).  
 
 
2.  Econometric Analysis  
 
The econometric analysis consisted of two stages. First, a probit model is estimated to assess the 
factors which determine the marketing channel utilized, specifically whether farmers sell only to 
a  commercial  buyer  or  sell  to  final  consumers.  For  an  analysis  of  price  heterogeneity  it  is 
important to separate out those farmers that sell also to final consumers from those that supply 
only commercial buyers. In the second stage we investigate the determinants of farm gate milk 
prices focusing on those that sell only to commercial buyers.  
 
The two stages of the analysis are linked in that it is likely that the characteristics of farmers that 
sell only to commercial buyers differ from those that sell also to final consumers. Unobservable 
characteristics affecting the decision to sell only to commercial buyers will be correlated with the 
milk price received by the farmer. Selectivity bias would be present, therefore, if we were to draw 
inferences about the determinants of milk prices for all farmers based on the observed milk prices 
of the subset of farmers that sell only to commercial buyers. Heckman’s (1979) two-stage sample 
selection  model  copes  with  such  a  selection  problem  and  is  based  on  two  latent  dependent 
variable models, where the milk price received by the farmer is modeled in a second stage as a 
mixed-effects  linear  regression  model.  The  estimates  obtained  in  the  first  stage  are  used  to 
generate the inverse Mill’s ratio (MR). This ratio is required to account for possible sample 
selection bias in the second stage of the model (Heckman 1979; Greene 2003). While the paper 
presents the results of both stages, the principal focus of the analysis lies with the second step. 
The remainder of this section outlines the two stages in greater detail. 
 
Probit Model of Determinants of Marketing Channel Utilized   9 
It is expected that a farmer’s decision to use a commercial marketing channel or not is influenced 
by a multitude of factors, related to farm characteristics (fc), collaboration with other farmers (cb) 
and  herd  characteristics  (h).  Previous  research  on  farming  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
(Lerman, 2001; Mathijs and Noev, 2004) and developing countries (Barrett, 2008; Nwigwe et al. 
2009)  identify  these  factors  as  important  determinants  of  the  marketing  channel  utilized.  To 
capture farm characteristics the following variables are included: total land owned, total land 
rented, pasture land used, common pasture land used, and the number of full- and part-time 
employees. Collaboration behavior records if farmers cooperate with others in the processing of 
milk, purchasing of inputs, lobbying, milk storage or in any other manner (e.g. machinery ring). 
Herd characteristics cover the number of milking cows, number of heifers, number of calves and 
average milk yield per cow. 
 
The final estimation model is described by: 
 
Pi=1	 ﾠif	 ﾠα+jβjfcij+kγkcbik+lδlhil+u>00	 ﾠotherwise  (1) 
where   is a binary variable which takes the value one if the farmer sells to commercial buyers 
only and zero if the farmer decided to sell also to final consumers, α, β, γ, δ, and θ are the 
parameters to estimate, and u is the error term. 
 
Mixed-Effects Linear Regression of Determinants of Milk Price 
Secondly, we investigate the determinants of variations in farm gate milk prices for those that sell 
to commercial buyers only. Here, the dependent variable is the actual price of milk in Euros per 
liter received by farmers. Data were collected in national currencies and converted to Euros using 
average  exchange  rates  for  the  period  in  question.  Separate  models  are  constructed  for  each 
country  (Armenia,  Moldova  and  Ukraine).  Milk  price  data  covered  three  periods,  with 
respondents providing an average price received in winter 2005/6, summer 2005 and the 2004/5 
winter season.  
   10 
As some of the covariates are grouped according to one or more characteristics (i.e. representing 
clustered, and therefore dependent data with respect to space and other characteristics) we apply a 
multi-level  modeling  approach  commonly  referred  to  as  mixed-effects  or  hierarchical  model 
(Fox, 2002; Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Such a mixed model is characterized as containing 
both fixed and random effects. The fixed effects are analogous to standard regression coefficients 
and are estimated directly. The random effects are not directly estimated but are summarized 
according to their estimated variances and covariances. Random effects may take the form of 
either  random  intercepts  or  random  coefficients,  and  the  grouping  structure  of  the  data  may 
consist of multiple levels of nested groups.




                        (2) 
with bn ~iid N(0, ξb
2), cov(bn, bn-1)= ξn,n-1, u~iid N(0, σ
2λim), cov(uim, ui-1,m)= σ
2λimi-1. Pim as the 
value of the response variable for the i-th observation in the m-th group; ε, υ, µ, ρ, τ, ϕ are the 
fixed-effect coefficients which are identical for all groups m; Pimt-1, opim, msim, trim, sim are the 
fixed-effect regressors for observation i in group m (where Pt-1  is the milk price in 2005; op is 
the  size  of  operation  [number  of  milking  cows];  ms  refers  to  a  vector  of  milk  marketing  
characteristics [number of potential commercial buyers, % of milk output sold on contract, % of 
milk output sold through a marketing cooperative, milk sold via collecting station]; tr is a vector 
of trust related variables [trust in seller, a cross effect between trust and % of milk output sold on 
contract]; and MR is the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the first stage regression controlling 
for potential selection bias). bn are the random-effect coefficients for group m, assumed to be 
multivariately normally distributed and varying by group; bn are designed as random variables 
and  are  hence  similar  to  the  errors  u;  zn  are  the  random-effect  regressors;  ξb
2  and  ξn,n-1  are 
variances and covariances among the random effects assumed to be constant across groups; uim is 
the error for observation i in group m assumed to be multivariately normally distributed; σ
2λimi-1 
                                                 
3 The error distribution of the linear mixed model is assumed to be Gaussian.  
 
   11 
are the covariances between errors in group m.
4 The model in (2) is estimated by maximum 
restricted (or residual) likelihood (REML) (Harville, 1977).
5  
 
The analysis includes as independent variables factors identified in the literature discussed above 
as potentially causing price heterogeneity. Regarding market competitiveness, surveyed farmers 
estimated the total number of potential commercial buyers for their milk. This captures the degree 
of  switching  power  farmers  have  in  marketing  milk  and  the  degree  to  which  markets  are 
characterized by monopsony. Four measures relate to transaction / marketing characteristics. To 
test the notion that marketing cooperatives can improve the prices received by farmers for their 
output, the analysis includes as a variable the percentage of a farm’s total output that is sold via a 
marketing cooperative. While cooperative membership may deliver other benefits to farmers, in 
Eastern Europe farmers perceive low output prices to be their main problem (Mathijs and Noev, 
2002) and the success of cooperation in marketing is assessed in terms of improving output 
prices. 
 
Farmers may sell their output on contract rather than via spot markets. Contracts should provide a 
greater degree of certainty for buyers regarding the availability of supply, for which a buyer may 
pay a premium (Gow, Streeter, and Swinnen, 2000). The study therefore includes the percentage 
of a farm’s total output sold on contract as an independent variable. To capture the reliability of 
buyers,  a  measure  of  trust  was  included:  farmers  responded  to  a  5  point  Likert  scale  to  the 
statement “My main buyer keeps the promises it makes to us” where 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly  agree.  Doney  and  Cannon  (1997)  developed  this  measure  of  trust  and  it  has  been 
successfully incorporated into several subsequent studies on supply chain relationships (Pavlou, 
2003,  Johnston  et  al.  2004).  Finally  regarding  marketing  characteristics,  a  dummy  variable 
captures whether the farm sells via a village collecting station. Village milk collecting stations are 
common in the CIS, but quality testing has often been rudimentary (Gorton, Dumitrashko, and 
White,  2006).  Where  quality  testing  is  weak,  asymmetric  information  may  lead,  following 
Akerlof’s  (1970)  market  for  lemons,  to  good  milk  being  crowded  out  and  prices  depressed. 
                                                 
4 In our case, observations are sampled independently within groups and are assumed to have constant error variance 
(λimi=σ
2, λimi-1=0), and thus the only free parameter to estimate is the common error variance, σ
2. 
5 We also tested for other groupings with respect to the random effects specification, however, none of these showed 
to be of satisfactory significance.   12 
Appendix  1  describes  the  dependent  and  independent  variables  included  in  the  models,  and 
presents summary statistics. 
 
We model the random effects variables around the group variable ‘trust’. Hence ‘trust’ (based on 
the Likert type scale) is estimated as random effects regressed on milk selling characteristics (% 
of milk sold on contract’, % of milk output sold through marketing cooperative and whether milk 
is sold via a collecting station). The rationale for this is that the definition and interpretation of 
‘trust’ in this context is to a considerable extent randomly determined based on non-observable 
individual experiences in the past. Hence, it is necessary to estimate the variance around the 
different Likert scale based ‘trust’ levels as a function of variables that potentially approximate 
these (unobservable) experiences. As the structure and processes related to selling via contracts, 
marketing  cooperatives,  and  collecting  stations  most  likely  follow  specific  patterns  across 
countries and regions, it seems reasonable to assume that this unobservable randomness related to 
the  interpretation/experience  of  ‘trust’  can  be  approximated  by  these  selling  and  cooperation 
characterizing features. However, a certain part of this effect must be observable and ‘fixed’ 
across observations; hence we also include a fixed effect with respect to the ‘trust’ variable. 
 
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our estimates obtained by (1), and (2) by applying a 
simple  stochastic  re-sampling  procedure  based  on  bootstrapping  techniques  (Efron  and 
Tibshirani, 1993).  
 
3.  Data Set 
 
Given  the  objective  of  identifying  the  determinants  of  variations  in  farm-gate  prices,  the 
population of interest was defined as primary producers who sell cows’ milk to another supply 
chain  actor.  Therefore  farmers  without  dairy  cows,  those  who  did  not  sell  any  of  the  milk 
produced or who processed all milk themselves (i.e. did not sell any raw milk) were excluded 
from the study. While given the focus of this research these restrictions are justified, it means that 
our sample cannot be directly compared to official data on the structure of milk production. For 
data collection, a quota of 300 responses was set per country with the intention of including a   13 
representative cross-section of commercial dairy farms, including both household producers that 
sold milk and agricultural companies.  
 
From the three countries, in total 916 responses were obtained (300 each from Armenia and 
Moldova and 316 from Ukraine). The Moldovan sample includes farms from all regions of the 
country  excluding  the  breakaway  Pridnestrovian  Moldavian  Republic.  Excluding  the  latter 
territory, which does not recognize the laws of the Republic of Moldova, farms were sampled 
from  the  northern,  central  and  southern  regions  of  the  country  in  line  with  each  region’s 
contribution  to  total  milk  production.  In  Ukraine,  data  collection  concentrated  on  the 
Dnepropetrovsk region.
6 Dnepropetrovsk, the country’s third largest city is the administrative 
centre of the region. The region’s mean wage and standard of living is close to the Ukrainian 
average. Within this region, sampling was weighted to five districts (rayons) that have significant 
commercial dairy production. The Armenian sample comprises farms from all regions (marzes) 
that have significant commercial milk production. The weighting given to each region was in 
accordance with that area’s contribution to Armenia’s total milk production. National statistical 
agencies, local and regional authorities, village majors, local livestock experts and agricultural 
agencies aided the identification of individual farms. A single source could not be used as most 
1-2 cow farm units are unregistered. 
 
The sample is divided into two groups: (i) those who sell directly to final consumers via local 
markets  and  informal  sales  and  (ii)  those  that  only s e l l   milk  to  a  commercial  buyer  (milk 
processor, logistics firm or other intermediary actor). Table 1 outlines the characteristics of the 
two sub-samples. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Overall, the median herd size is low (2 milking cows). The mean is higher (17.2) due to a small 
number  of  much  larger  operations  in  Ukraine  with  1,000-1,500  milking  cows.  In  the  entire 
sample there are only six farms with 500 or more cows. In contrast, 219 operators possess only 
                                                 
6 As Ukraine is geographically the largest country solely within Europe, it was not possible to survey all regions 
within the framework of the research project.   14 
one milking cow (23.9% of the sample) and 290 farmers own two cows (31.7% of the sample). 
The majority of farmers surveyed therefore possess two or fewer cows and this is in line with 
other  studies  for  the  CIS  (Dumitrashko,  2003;  Keyser,  2004).  There  are  however  significant 
differences in the distribution of farms across countries. Ukraine has a bi-modal distribution with 
a large number of very small units (1-2 cows) but also a group of relatively large corporate farms, 
each with 200 cows or more. The Ukrainian sample includes both small-scale units and corporate 
farms. Many of the latter dairy farms in Ukraine originate from the state and collective farms of 
the Soviet era. However their management style is now, in general, radically different and a lot 
received significant investment from entrepreneurs and business groups that accumulated wealth 
in other sectors of the economy (Skripnik, Chernyshova and Vinichenko, 2005).  
 
In Moldova, 2 cow units predominate, with only a handful of farms with 50 or more cows. This 
extreme fragmentation follows Moldova’s radical decollectivization where the assets and land of 
former state and collective farms were divided up between members (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder, 
2004). A unimodal distribution characterizes Armenia, with the mode being between 6 and 9 
cows. Only 1 farm in the sample with 20 or more cows sells to final consumers, the vast majority 
of relatively large operators therefore deal only with commercial buyers. Considering the micro-
producers,  approximately  15%  and  20%  of  one  and  two  cow  units  sell  to  final  consumers 









Table 2 presents summary statistics on milk prices for those farms selling solely to commercial 
buyers.  In  2006,  the  average  price  actually  received  by  farms  was  €0.1754  per  liter.  The 
respective figures for Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine were €0.175, €0.153 and €0.193. These 
farm gate prices are low by international standards and in line with earlier estimates (Venema, 
2002; Perekhozhuk, 2007). The order of farm gate prices across countries, however, varies over 
time. In 2005, the average farm gate prices in Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine were €0.131,   15 
€0.151 and €0.140 respectively. In 2004, prices were higher in Ukraine (€0.1740) relative to 
Armenia (€0.133) and Moldova (€0.132). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Econometric Analysis 
Tables  3  to  8  summarize  the  results  for  the  estimated  models.  According  to  the  different 
diagnosis tests performed, all estimated model specifications show a statistical significance at a 
satisfactory level and no severe signs of misspecification (see model quality measures). These 
conclusions  are  supported  by  the  bootstrapped  bias-corrected  standard  errors.  The  linear 
hypotheses tests conducted with respect to the significance of groups of explanatory variables 
indicate the relevance of the final specifications. We further tested for potential endogeneity of 
some of the explanatory variables as well as collinearity between different regressors. 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the bootstrapped probit models for determinants of marketing channel 
utilized  for  Armenia,  Moldova  and  Ukraine  respectively.  Overall,  farmers  that  sell  only  to 
commercial  buyers  operate  on  a  larger  scale  - i n  each  country  there  are  significant  positive 
relationships with the number of full-time employees, total land owned and number of milking 
cows.  
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 about here 
 
The partial productivity (average yield per cow) of those farms that sell only to commercial 
buyers is higher in each of the countries studied. Those selling only to commercial buyers are 
significantly more likely to have used extension services and cooperate with other farmers in the 
marketing of raw and processed milk. In Armenia and Ukraine, those selling only to commercial 
buyers are also significantly more likely to cooperate with other farmers in milk storage. These 
findings on scale, use of extension services and cooperation are consistent with previous findings 
on factors affecting market participation and involvement in formal supply chains (Mathijs and 
Noev, 2004; Barrett, 2008; Nwigwe et al. 2009). Those supplying commercial buyers only are 
significantly less likely to cooperate with farmers on ‘other matters’ in Armenia and Moldova,   16 
but significantly more likely to cooperate with fellow farmers on ‘other matters’ in Ukraine. In 
Armenia and Moldova, ‘other matters’ relates largely to the use of common pasture land, where it 
is  ubiquitous.  90  and  91  per  cent  of  the  Armenian  and  Moldovan  farmers  surveyed  utilized 
common pasture land in 2005 respectively. In Ukraine, cooperation on other matters is far less 
common  (11.7  per  cent  of  sampled  farmers)  and  relates  principally  to  veterinary  and 
transportation services.  
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the results of the bootstrapped mixed-effects linear regression models 
for the determinants of farm gate milk prices in Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova respectively. 
Even after other factors are controlled for, Armenian and Moldovan farmers operating on a larger 
scale  receive  a  better  price  for  their  milk.  In  these  countries,  the  production  base  is  more 
fragmented and processors appear to place a greater premium on securing suppliers from the 
relatively small number of larger producers (Gorton, Dumitrashko, and White, 2006). This is in 
accordance with the theory that transaction costs for buyers will be lower when procuring from 
fewer, larger dairy farms (Reardon et al. 2009) and that in general transaction costs favor larger 
suppliers (Swinnen, 2005). Interviews with dairy processors suggest that they are willing to share 
with larger farms some of the benefits of lower transaction costs to secure their output (White and 
Gorton,  2004).  In  Ukraine  no  such  relationship  between  farm  gate  prices  and  herd  size  is 
apparent. Ukraine did not witness during transition such a dramatic fragmentation in the structure 
of dairy farming and it appears that in this market, size alone does not guarantee favorable terms. 
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 about here 
 
Selling through a marketing cooperative has a significant and positive, albeit modest, effect on 
farm gate milk prices in Armenia and Ukraine. No such relationship is apparent in Moldova. In 
Armenia and Ukraine, less than 6 per cent of farms sampled sold milk through a marketing 
cooperative, while in Moldova 58 per cent reported sales through cooperation with other farmers. 
This  suggests  a  possible  first  mover  advantage.  Where  marketing  cooperatives  are  absent, 
processors  may  welcome  the  development  more,  and  farmers  improve  their  relative  position 
slightly. However, where marketing cooperatives are ubiquitous, joining such an organization 
may not generate such an advantage. 
   17 
For  all  three  countries,  the  use  of  contracting  is  significant.  Contracts  give  buyers  greater 
certainty in supply and they are willing to pay a premium for this, particularly during a period of 
growing  demand  as  witnessed  at  the  time  of  study.  Those  farmers  that  sell  via  marketing 
cooperatives sell almost exclusively on contract but for other buyers (processors, intermediaries) 
the picture is more mixed. For those farmers that have signed a contract, a major motivating 
factor was the prospect of a higher milk price - only 7.8 per cent of the whole sample reported 
that a higher milk price was of no importance in influencing them to sign a contract.  
 
In all three countries, trust in supply relationships is also positively and significantly related to 
the milk price actually received by farmers. Buyers appear willing to pay a premium to farmers 
that they trust and forsake opportunistic behavior. The interaction effect of trust and contracting 
suggests that these are mutually reinforcing, with buyers valuing certainty in supply. This is 
particularly important in the CIS where supply chain disruption and high levels of opportunistic 
behavior hindered the viability of the whole supply chain (Gorton, Dumitrashko, and White, 
2006). In all cases there are significant positive relationships between current and previous years’ 
milk prices. The analysis also incorporates an interaction effect (price 2005 x trust) to further 
account for the strong influence of the previous year’s price, assuming that successful and stable 
buying relationships (i.e. a relatively high previous price and significant trust in buyer) manifest 
in a non-linear effect. The significance of this interaction effect implies that there are increasing 
returns  with  respect  to  positive  business  experiences  in  previous  periods  if  the  trading 
relationship is characterised by significant trust. 
 
In all three countries, there is a significant, positive relationship between the milk price and the 
number  of  potential  commercial  buyers.    This  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that  greater 
competition leads to more equal rent sharing (Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck, 2004). Farmers’ 
welfare can be improved by stimulating competition for their output. Competition is not fully 
developed  in  the  region  - j ust  over  one  quarter  of  those  selling  only  to  commercial  buyers 
reported that they realistically had only one buyer for their milk, implying that local monopsonies 
persist in the CIS. 
   18 
Finally, the models for Armenia and Ukraine indicate a significant, negative relationship between 
the prices received by farmers and selling via a collecting station. The results for these countries 
are consistent with notions that prices are depressed where the ability to accurately measure 
quality, such as at village collecting stations, is weak (Akerlof, 1970). Yet in Moldova, a positive 
relationship between milk prices and selling via a collecting station is evident. The latter result 
appears inconsistent with theory. In assessing the difference in results it is important to note 
however that village collecting stations remain far more prominent in Moldova. In Armenia and 
Ukraine  only  30  and  28  per  cent  of  sampled  farmers  reported  selling  via  collecting  stations 
respectively. The comparable figure for Moldova was 71 per cent. It maybe where they remain 




5.  Conclusion 
 
A weak non-farm economy, the absence of effective social safety nets and a dependence on 
agriculture characterize rural areas in the CIS. The welfare of farmers therefore depends greatly 
on  the  prices  received  by  farmers  for  their  output.  This  justifies  the  examination  of  the 
determinants of variations in farm gate prices and we examine milk prices in Armenia, Moldova 
and Ukraine for a sample of 918 operators. 
 
The analysis suggests three main strategies to improve the prices received by farmers for their 
output: consolidation, stimulating competition for output and stable supply chain relationships. 
In the Armenian and Moldovan cases, farmers with larger operations secured higher prices for 
their output. The transaction costs of dealing with a smaller number of larger suppliers are less 
and the analysis presents empirical evidence which confirms larger scale producers receive more 
favorable  prices.  In  all  cases,  competition,  as  measured  by  the  number  of  potential  buyers, 
stimulated higher farm gate prices. Despite the number of years that have passed since the end of 
central planning, effective competition remains absent from some local markets - over a quarter 
of farmers sampled reported that they confronted a local monopsony with only one potential 
buyer for their output. Finally, buyers value the security in supply which comes from trusted   19 
relationships  and  contracts.  Given  the  significant  and  consistent  linkages  with  milk  prices, 
establishing such relationships is in the long-term interest of farmers. 
 
The evidence on marketing cooperatives is mixed. In Armenia and Ukraine, selling via marketing 
cooperatives improves significantly, albeit modestly, the price received by farmers while there 
are significant negative relationships with selling via village collecting stations. These findings 
are consistent with theory (Akerlof, 1970; Morgan, 2008). However, these relationships do not 
hold for Moldova where marketing cooperatives and village collecting stations are relatively 
more common. This suggests that buyers are pragmatic, they may support the development of 
marketing  cooperatives,  through  higher  prices,  more  where  they  are  initially  absent  and 
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Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ
Sell	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
commercial	 ﾠ
buyer(s)	 ﾠ
Sell	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠ
buyer(s)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ 187	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ 219	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ 232	 ﾠ 58	 ﾠ 290	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ 43	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ 57	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠto	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ 105	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ 118	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠto	 ﾠ19	 ﾠ 76	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠto	 ﾠ49	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
50	 ﾠto	 ﾠ99	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
100	 ﾠto	 ﾠ199	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
200	 ﾠto	 ﾠ499	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
500+	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ 780	 ﾠ 136	 ﾠ 916	 ﾠ





Table 2: Summary Statistics for milk prices, farms selling solely to commercial buyers 
	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠ(Euros	 ﾠper	 ﾠliter)	 ﾠ Std.	 ﾠDeviation	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠactually	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.1754	 ﾠ .03890	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠactually	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ(2005)s	 ﾠ 0.1397	 ﾠ .03115	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠactually	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠ 0.1472	 ﾠ .03903	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠactually	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ(Armenia)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.1750	 ﾠ .04122	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠactually	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ(Moldova)	 ﾠ 0.1532	 ﾠ .04624	 ﾠ





















index	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠselling	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(mean	 ﾠprobability)	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠowned	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.078**	 ﾠ 0.036	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠrented	 ﾠ 0.001	 ﾠ 0.004	 ﾠ
Pasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.009	 ﾠ 0.011	 ﾠ
Common	 ﾠpasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ 0.001**	 ﾠ 6.18e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
Full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ 0.221***	 ﾠ 0.086	 ﾠ
Part-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.116**	 ﾠ 0.057	 ﾠ
Extension	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
Technical	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ 0.365*	 ﾠ 0.204	 ﾠ
Collaboration	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠraw	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.363*	 ﾠ 0.214	 ﾠ
Processing	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.269	 ﾠ 0.476	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocessed	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.384***	 ﾠ 0.067	 ﾠ
Purchasing	 ﾠof	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠ 0.192	 ﾠ 0.345	 ﾠ
Lobbying	 ﾠ	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.564	 ﾠ 0.495	 ﾠ
Milk	 ﾠstorage	 ﾠ 0.910***	 ﾠ 0.265	 ﾠ
Other	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.232***	 ﾠ 0.326	 ﾠ
Herd	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ 0.015***	 ﾠ 0.001	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠheifers	 ﾠ 0.002	 ﾠ 0.021	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠcalves	 ﾠ 0.012	 ﾠ 0.017	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠyield	 ﾠper	 ﾠcow	 ﾠ 3.03e-ﾭ‐04*	 ﾠ 1.77e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
Constant	 ﾠ 1.846***	 ﾠ 0.393	 ﾠ
log-ﾭ‐likelihood	 ﾠ(LogL)	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐191.435	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠchi2(20)	 ﾠ 145.55***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Pseudo	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.754	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
McFadden’s	 ﾠAdj.	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.921	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
McKelvey&Zavoina’s	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.980	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.853	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
linear	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠtests	 ﾠon	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ(chi
2(x))	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(6))	 ﾠ 22.89***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠcollaboration	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠregressors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(7))	 ﾠ 20.56***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠherd	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(4))	 ﾠ 33.44***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1:	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ10%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ5%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ***	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1%-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ
2:	 ﾠBootstrapped	 ﾠand	 ﾠbias-ﾭ‐corrected	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠbootstrap	 ﾠreplications).	 ﾠ
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index	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠselling	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(mean	 ﾠprobability)	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠowned	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.042***	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠrented	 ﾠ 1.68e-ﾭ‐03	 ﾠ 0.002	 ﾠ
Pasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ 4.44e-ﾭ‐03	 ﾠ 0.005	 ﾠ
Common	 ﾠpasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ 0.006**	 ﾠ 5.72e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
Full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ 0.081***	 ﾠ 0.009	 ﾠ
Part-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.055	 ﾠ 0.056	 ﾠ
Extension	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
Technical	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ 0.505**	 ﾠ 0.055	 ﾠ
Collaboration	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠraw	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.122**	 ﾠ 0.052	 ﾠ
Processing	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.502	 ﾠ 0.603	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocessed	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.313***	 ﾠ 0.052	 ﾠ
Purchasing	 ﾠof	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.149	 ﾠ 0.486	 ﾠ
Lobbying	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.164	 ﾠ 0.739	 ﾠ
Milk	 ﾠstorage	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.276	 ﾠ 0.471	 ﾠ
Other	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.139***	 ﾠ 0.321	 ﾠ
Herd	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ 0.007***	 ﾠ 0.002	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠheifers	 ﾠ 0.034*	 ﾠ 0.014	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠcalves	 ﾠ 0.021	 ﾠ 0.024	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠyield	 ﾠper	 ﾠcow	 ﾠ 0.009**	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ
Constant	 ﾠ 1.169***	 ﾠ 0.363	 ﾠ
log-ﾭ‐likelihood	 ﾠ(LogL)	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐148.112	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠchi2(20)	 ﾠ 50.05***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Pseudo	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.741	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
McFadden’s	 ﾠAdj.	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.710	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
McKelvey&Zavoina’s	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.999	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.918	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
linear	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠtests	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ(chi
2(x))	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(6))	 ﾠ 64.40***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠcollaboration	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠregressors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(7))	 ﾠ 9.82**	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠherd	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(4))	 ﾠ 10.71**	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1:	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ10%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ5%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ***	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1%-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ
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index	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠselling	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(mean	 ﾠprobability)	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠowned	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 0.042**	 ﾠ 0.019	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠrented	 ﾠ 8.48e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ 0.001	 ﾠ
Pasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ 1.96e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ
Common	 ﾠpasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ 4.57e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ 0.001	 ﾠ
Full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ 0.031***	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ
Part-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.027	 ﾠ 0.054	 ﾠ
Extension	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
Technical	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ 0.354**	 ﾠ 0.118	 ﾠ
Collaboration	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠraw	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.816***	 ﾠ 0.259	 ﾠ
Processing	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.215	 ﾠ 0.921	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocessed	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ 0.413***	 ﾠ 0.077	 ﾠ
Purchasing	 ﾠof	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠ 0.211	 ﾠ 0.323	 ﾠ
Lobbying	 ﾠ	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.733	 ﾠ 0.750	 ﾠ
Milk	 ﾠstorage	 ﾠ 0.767***	 ﾠ 0.318	 ﾠ
Other	 ﾠ 0.922***	 ﾠ 0.203	 ﾠ
Herd	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ 0.015***	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠheifers	 ﾠ 0.017	 ﾠ 0.051	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠcalves	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ 0.038	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠyield	 ﾠper	 ﾠcow	 ﾠ 5.45-ﾭ‐05***	 ﾠ 1.35e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
Constant	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.378	 ﾠ 0.333	 ﾠ
log-ﾭ‐likelihood	 ﾠ(LogL)	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐233.292	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠchi2(20)	 ﾠ 110.34***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Pseudo	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.912	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
McFadden’s	 ﾠAdj.	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.521	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
McKelvey&Zavoina’s	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.999	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.805	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
linear	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠtests	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ(chi
2(x))	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(6))	 ﾠ 16.76***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠcollaboration	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠregressors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(7))	 ﾠ 14.05***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠherd	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(4))	 ﾠ 41.61***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1:	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ10%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ5%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ***	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1%-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ
2:	 ﾠBootstrapped	 ﾠand	 ﾠbias-ﾭ‐corrected	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠ10,000	 ﾠbootstrap	 ﾠreplications).	 ﾠ
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Table 6: Estimates Bootstrapped ME REML Regression (Stage 2) – Armenia 
 
Milk	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2006
	 ﾠ






past	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ 0.701***	 ﾠ 0.089	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ 4.49e-ﾭ‐05***	 ﾠ 1.07e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠselling	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠ 0.007***	 ﾠ 8.81e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ 0.039**	 ﾠ 0.015	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative	 ﾠ 8.76e-ﾭ‐05***	 ﾠ 4.78e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.049**	 ﾠ 0.022	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠin	 ﾠseller	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠ(Likert	 ﾠscale	 ﾠbased)	 ﾠ 0.023*	 ﾠ 0.010	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠx	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ 0.003**	 ﾠ 0.001	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠx	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ 0.181***	 ﾠ 0.006	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠsample	 ﾠselection	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
inverse	 ﾠMill’s	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ 0.004**	 ﾠ 0.002	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
constant	 ﾠ 0.187***	 ﾠ 0.008	 ﾠ
random	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(contract)	 ﾠ 0.006***	 ﾠ 0.001	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative)	 ﾠ 3.36e-ﾭ‐05*	 ﾠ 1.46e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation)	 ﾠ 0.047***	 ﾠ 0.018	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(constant)	 ﾠ 0.033***	 ﾠ 0.015	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠtest	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ(chi2(5))	 ﾠ 49.05***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Log-ﾭ‐restricted	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠ 1017.288	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Wald	 ﾠchi2(10)	 ﾠ 2017.09***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
linear	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠtests	 ﾠon	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ(chi
2(x))	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠprice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(2))	 ﾠ 1102.13***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠselling	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(4))	 ﾠ 38.76***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠregressors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(3))	 ﾠ 16.22***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(2))	 ﾠ 9.54***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1:	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ10%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ5%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ***	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1%-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ
2:	 ﾠBootstrapped	 ﾠand	 ﾠbias-ﾭ‐corrected	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠ10.000	 ﾠbootstrap	 ﾠreplications).	 ﾠ  30 
 
Table 7: Estimates Bootstrapped ME REML Regression (Stage 2) – Moldova 
 
Milk	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2006
	 ﾠ






past	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ 0.814***	 ﾠ 0.027	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ 5.85e-ﾭ‐05***	 ﾠ 1.14e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠselling	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠ 0.002***	 ﾠ 7.63e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ 0.025*	 ﾠ 0.014	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐5.91e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ 5.14e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation	 ﾠ 0.011**	 ﾠ 0.004	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠin	 ﾠseller	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠ(Likert	 ﾠscale	 ﾠbased)	 ﾠ 0.033***	 ﾠ 0.005	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠx	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ 0.087***	 ﾠ 0.025	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠx	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ 0.211***	 ﾠ 0.008	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠsample	 ﾠselection	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
inverse	 ﾠMill’s	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ 0.016**	 ﾠ 0.008	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
constant	 ﾠ 0.156***	 ﾠ 0.009	 ﾠ
random	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(contract)	 ﾠ 0.008***	 ﾠ 0.004	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative)	 ﾠ 8.02e-ﾭ‐04***	 ﾠ 3.48e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation)	 ﾠ 0.006*	 ﾠ 0.004	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(constant)	 ﾠ 0.004	 ﾠ 0.003	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠtest	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ(chi2(5))	 ﾠ 63.00***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Log-ﾭ‐restricted	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠ 1370.092	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Wald	 ﾠchi2(10)	 ﾠ 769.60***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
linear	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠtests	 ﾠon	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ(chi
2(x))	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠprice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(2))	 ﾠ 1094.13***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠselling	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(4))	 ﾠ 40.01**	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠregressors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(3))	 ﾠ 658.31***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(2))	 ﾠ 13.31***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1:	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ10%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ5%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ***	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1%-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ
2:	 ﾠBootstrapped	 ﾠand	 ﾠbias-ﾭ‐corrected	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠ10.000	 ﾠbootstrap	 ﾠreplications).	 ﾠ
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Table 8: Estimates Bootstrapped ME REML Regression (Stage 2) – Ukraine 
 
Milk	 ﾠPrice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2006
	 ﾠ






past	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ 0.983***	 ﾠ 0.021	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilking	 ﾠcows	 ﾠ 7.27e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ 8.55e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠselling	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠ 0.005***	 ﾠ 9.70e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ 0.019**	 ﾠ 0.008	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative	 ﾠ 8.15e-ﾭ‐05*	 ﾠ 4.65e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.058***	 ﾠ 0.018	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠin	 ﾠseller	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠ(Likert	 ﾠscale	 ﾠbased)	 ﾠ 0.033***	 ﾠ 0.005	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠx	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠ 0.008*	 ﾠ 0.004	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠx	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ 0.234***	 ﾠ 0.007	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠsample	 ﾠselection	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
inverse	 ﾠMill’s	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ 0.016**	 ﾠ 0.008	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
constant	 ﾠ 0.158***	 ﾠ 0.018	 ﾠ
random	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
trust	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(contract)	 ﾠ 0.012**	 ﾠ 0.005	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠsold	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative)	 ﾠ 3.46e-ﾭ‐04***	 ﾠ 1.24e-ﾭ‐04	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation)	 ﾠ 0.022***	 ﾠ 0.007	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ(constant)	 ﾠ 0.019***	 ﾠ 0.006	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
LR	 ﾠtest	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ(chi2(5))	 ﾠ 64.30***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Log-ﾭ‐restricted	 ﾠLikelihood	 ﾠ 1174.888	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Wald	 ﾠchi2(10)	 ﾠ 1258.05***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
linear	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠtests	 ﾠon	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ(chi
2(x))	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠprice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(2))	 ﾠ 2259.63***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠselling	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(4))	 ﾠ 16.96***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠregressors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(3))	 ﾠ 52.51***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
H0:	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(chi
2(2))	 ﾠ 11.36***	 ﾠ(rejected)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1:	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ10%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ5%-ﾭ‐,	 ﾠ***	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1%-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ
2:	 ﾠBootstrapped	 ﾠand	 ﾠbias-ﾭ‐corrected	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(based	 ﾠon	 ﾠ10.000	 ﾠbootstrap	 ﾠreplications).	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Appendix 1: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
	 ﾠ
Variables	 ﾠ Description	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠ Minimum	 ﾠ Maximum	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠChannel	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠsell	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyer,	 ﾠ0=	 ﾠsell	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠ





	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Milk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠprice	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠper	 ﾠlitre,	 ﾠEuros	 ﾠ(only	 ﾠ
commercial	 ﾠbuyers)	 ﾠ
0.175	 ﾠ 0.05	 ﾠ 0.43	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Independent	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠowned	 ﾠ Measured	 ﾠin	 ﾠhectares	 ﾠ(ha)	 ﾠ 74.2	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 14000	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠland	 ﾠrented	 ﾠ ha	 ﾠ 87.1	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 8300	 ﾠ
Pasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠused	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Owned	 ﾠor	 ﾠrented,	 ﾠha	 ﾠ 7.7	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 450	 ﾠ
Common	 ﾠpasture	 ﾠland	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠ
ha	 ﾠ 45.0	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 6140	 ﾠ
Full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ 3.6	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 319	 ﾠ
Part-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠpart-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ 1.5	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 87	 ﾠ
Technical	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ Received	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ0	 ﾠ 0.29	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠraw	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ Collaborate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ 0.23	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Processing	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ Collaborate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Marketing	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠ
milk	 ﾠ
Collaborate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ 0.09	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Lobbying	 ﾠ Collaborate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Milk	 ﾠstorage	 ﾠ Collaborate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Average	 ﾠyield	 ﾠper	 ﾠcow	 ﾠ Average	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠlitres	 ﾠper	 ﾠcow,	 ﾠper	 ﾠday	 ﾠ 11.5	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
commercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠ
Estimated	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠfarmers’	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠ
2.3	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
contract	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠcontract,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠselling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
commercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
29.4	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠ
marketing	 ﾠcooperative	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠ	 ﾠvia	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠcooperative,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
selling	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠbuyers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
43.8	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ
Milk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠ
station	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ=	 ﾠmilk	 ﾠsold	 ﾠvia	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠstation,	 ﾠ0	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ 0.42	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Trust	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠLikert	 ﾠscale	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ‘my	 ﾠmain	 ﾠbuyer	 ﾠkeeps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
promises	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠus’	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ=strongly	 ﾠdisagree,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ
strongly	 ﾠagree	 ﾠ
3.7	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ